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ABSTRACT
The Malaysian corporate governance varies according to the ownership structure of the corporate sector.  At one 
end of the spectrum there are companies in which ownership is dispersed among small shareholders, while control is 
concentrated in the hands of the large shareholders. This study analyses the role played by concentrated ownerships 
through the top ten shareholders of the non-financial firms that are listed on the KLSE in determining their performances. 
A total of 2608 companies are used in this study and various measures of performance and categories of ownerships 
are used to study the different effect of different ownerships on performance. Ownership roles are observed from two 
perspectives namely their ownership concentration and the components of this ownership concentration as proxy for 
corporate governance mechanisms. The finding from this empirical study provides information on the importance of 
large institutional shareholders in corporate governance. This study also providing evidence that, typically equity 
owned by the corporations, government, nominees and individuals are directly influencing the financial structures 
of the firms. This will eventually affect the overall performance of the firms. This indicates that to encourage firm 
performance, it very much dependent upon the supply of suitable management and directors as well as other 
stakeholder’s information.
ABSTRAK
Tadbir urus korporat di Malaysia berbeza mengikut struktur milik sektor korporat. Pada penghujung perbezaan ini, 
terdapat syarikat dengan struktur miliknya dianggotai oleh ramai individu sebagai pemilik kecil saham tetapi dikuasai 
oleh hanya sebilangan kecil pemilik besar saham. Kajian ini mengkaji peranan yang dimainkan oleh sepuluh pemilik 
terbesar bagi syarikat bukan kewangan yang disenaraikan di Bursa Malaysia mengikut prestasi. Jumlah syarikat yang 
dikaji adalah 2603 dan pelbagai pengukur prestasi dan kategori pemilikan digunakan bagi mengkaji pelbagai kesan 
pemilikan terhadap prestasi syarikat. Peranan pemilikan dikaji daripada dua  perspektif, iaitu pemusatan pemilikan 
dan komponen pemusatan pemilikan sebagai proksi kepada mekanisma tadbir urus korporat. Penemuan dari kajian 
empirikal ini memberi maklumat mengenai kepentingan pemilikan besar dari institusi dalam tadbir urus syarikat. 
Kajian ini juga membuktikan bahawa ekuiti yang dimiliki oleh syarikat, kerajaan dan individu mempengaruhi secara 
langsung struktur syarikat. Ini pada akhirnya akan mempengaruhi keseluruhan prestasi syarikat. Ini menunjukkan 
bahawa bagi menggalakkan prestasi syarikat, ianya bergantung kepada kewujudan pengurusan dan pengarah, selain 
daripada pihak-pihak yang berkempentingan. 
INTRODUCTION
Corporate ownership structures around the world 
are very diverse but there seem to be two distinct 
groups (La Porta et al. 1999). In the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, majority of the shares are widely held 
or diffuse, whereas in continental Europe shares 
tend to be concentrated in the hands of a few large 
shareholders. When ownership is diffuse, agency 
problems stem from conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 
1976; Roe 1994). As ownership concentration 
increases to a level where an owner obtains effective 
control of the firm, the nature of agency problems 
shifts away from the manager-shareholder conflicts 
to conflicts between the controlling owner and 
minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny 1997).
 Numerous studies have analysed the costs and 
benefits of the diffuse ownership. Shleifer and 
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Vishny (1986) assess whether large shareholders can 
minimise the free-rider problem that is associated 
with a dispersed ownership structure. When their 
shareholdings increase, investors can take a more 
proactive role in monitoring the managers, to the 
extent that they can even replace the managers by 
mounting a takeover bid. However, there are also 
worries that high ownership concentration can work 
to the other shareholders’ disadvantage. 
 The Malaysian corporate governance varies 
according to the ownership structure of the corporate 
sector. At one end of the spectrum there are 
companies in which ownership is dispersed among 
small shareholders, while control is concentrated in 
the hands of the large shareholders. The dispersed 
ownership situation is observed to be similar to 
countries with “common law” legal system – USA, 
UK (La Porta et al. 1999) where there are companies 
with concentrated ownership of large investors 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986). In such companies, 
controlling shareholder or debtor dictate of the 
actions of managers. The concentrated ownership 
is common for countries where it is quite costly for 
small investors to exercise their control and cash 
flow rights. Large investors enjoy economies of 
scale and reduced traditional free rider problem. 
Corporate governance  conducted by large investors 
is experienced  in the Continental Europe and Japan 
(La Porta et al. 1999). Experience from German 
corporations as observed by Gorton and Schmid 
(1996) suggests that block holders improved 
company performance. In Japanese corporations, 
large shareholders replace badly performed managers 
more often than dispersed ones (Kaplan & Minton 
1994).  
 This study analyses the role played by 
concentrated ownerships through the top ten 
shareholders of the non-financial firms that are listed 
on the KLSE in determining their performances. Their 
ownership roles are observed from two perspectives 
namely their ownership concentration and the 
components of this ownership concentration as 
proxy for corporate governance mechanisms. The 
component of these top ten largest shareholders are 
further classified into four ownership categories 
or types. They are the institutional ownership, 
ownership owned by the government, the nominees 
(both the finance and public nominees) as well as the 
individuals who owned the companies. Collectively 
these ownership types are represented as ownership 
mix (OM). Besides the board size, management 
holdings includes shares owned by the corporate 
board, the CEOs and top managements are also 
included in the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Ownership concentration is a direct corporate 
governance mechanism.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
note that, along with legal protection, ownership 
concentration is one of two common approaches to 
corporate governance. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1999) find high degrees of ownership 
concentration in many firms throughout the world, 
particularly in countries with relatively poor 
shareholder protection.  
 The primary benefit of ownership concentration 
by outsiders is that the large shareholder gains the 
power and incentive to monitor the actions of the 
manager (Shleifer & Vishny 1997).  An offsetting 
cost is that, at some point, the outside shareholder 
himself gains enough power to pursue personal 
objectives that may not coincide with the objectives 
of minority shareholders. Hence, there is an 
offsetting cost if outsiders are large shareholders.
 External shareholdings as those held by corporate 
or institutions, government  and individuals outside 
the company. As externally-held shareholdings 
increase, the incentive to increase the monitoring 
effort also increases. However, the evidence 
tends to support the hypothesis of increased 
institutional shareholdings being associated with 
better performance.  For example, for the US and the 
UK data, Schleifer and Vishny (1986) find a positive 
relationship between external shareholdings and 
performance.
 Various aspects of potential conflict of interest 
between corporate managers and dispersed 
shareholders when managers do not have an 
ownership interest in the firm have been emphasised 
by Jensen (1986). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argued that there is an incentive for the manager to 
adopt investment and financing policies that benefit 
him, but reduce the payoff to outside stockholders. 
An offsetting cost, discussed by Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1988), is that with larger shareholdings 
the manager may become entrenched, and immune 
to other forms of discipline. A particular form of 
entrenchment that might be important in emerging 
markets is that the manager could become resistant 
to monitoring by a large outside shareholder.
 Fauzias, Rasidah and Hendon (1994), evaluate 
the relationship between board ownership and 
financial performance as measured by Tobin Q, EPS 
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and PE ratios of Malaysian public listed company. 
They find that in a cross-section of 79 companies, 
Tobin Q, EPS and PE ratios rise for board ownership 
range of 0%-5%, fall as ownership rises between 5%-
25 (statistically significant for Tobin Q and PE ratios), 
and continue to rise except for PE ratio as board 
ownership rises beyond 25%. The entrenchment 
effect dominates the convergence-of-interest for firm 
with ownership range of 5%-25%.
 Jensen (1993) argues that boards with more than 
about 7 to 8 members are unlikely to be effective. 
According to him, large boards result in less 
effective coordination, communication and decision-
making, and are more likely to be controlled by 
the CEO.  Empirical findings by Yermack (1996), 
based on U.S. companies provides another strand of 
literature that investigates the different corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as the structure of 
the board. Wu (2000) also find that the presence of 
active institutional investors, in particular CalPERS, 
is associated with a tendency of firms to reduce 
board sizes, generally through the removal of inside 
directors.
 The corporate governance environment in East 
Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia 
is much different from that in the more developed 
markets. The USA has a much more developed 
shareholder-centered corporate governance system 
whereas and the Scandinavian countries such as 
Finland has a much more stakeholder-oriented 
corporate governance system. Studies provide 
evidence of negative relationship between board 
size and firm value appears to be generalisable 
to environments with widely different corporate 
governance systems.
 When Boards of Directors are passive they have 
the tendency to be friendly to management. As a 
result, they do not perform as expected in terms of 
their responsibilities in disciplining and monitoring 
the managers. This motivates the need to employ 
outsiders into the board.  Outside directors are those 
who do not have a family or business relationship 
with the managers of the firm. Similar to the issue 
of blockholder ownerships, the studies on the 
effect of outside directors on the agency problem 
yield mixed findings. While some studies find that 
outside directors align the interests of managers 
and shareholders, there are also studies that advise 
against having more outside directors.
 Outside directors may be appointed because of 
declining firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach 
1988). Kaplan and Minton (1994) find this to be 
more common in Japan, and future firm performance 
improves after the appointment of bank directors and 
corporate directors into the board.  Their results show 
the importance of relationship-oriented governance 
systems in Japan.  Weishbach (1988) finds higher 
incidence of CEO turnover for outsider-dominated 
firms with declining performance. Outsiders 
are more likely to fire poor performing CEOs to 
preserve their reputation and maintain their value 
in the managerial labor market. On the other hand, 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) find no relationship between board 
composition and performance.  Evidence that the 
existence of a time lag may be present, is suggested 
by Baysinger and Butler (1985) who report a ten-
year lagged relationship.
 Mak and Li (2001) examine the relationship 
between corporate ownership and board structure 
in Singapore. Managerial ownership and size of the 
board are negatively related to the proportion of 
outside directors. Since government has substantial 
involvement in the private sectors in Singapore (Mak 
& Chang 2000), they also examine the relationship 
between government ownership and board structure. 
They find that the companies with significant 
government ownership typically have boards with 
fewer outside directors.
 The effect of the structure and composition of 
the board of directors on firm performance is the 
subject of extensive research that does not reach 
a consensus. The degree of alignment between 
board and shareholder incentives varies with the 
composition of the board.  Some evidence supports 
a view that outside directors act in the interests of 
the shareholders and serve to monitor the managers 
(Weisbach 1988; Rosenstein & Wyatt 1990; Hermalin 
& Weisbach 1988; Mayers et al. 1997; Fama & Jensen 
1983). Outside directors are appointed in the interests 
of the shareholders and are more likely to remove 
CEOs following poor performance.
 The size of the board is also a device used to 
align interests of managers and board members. 
Small boards serve to control managers whereas 
a larger board may not function effectively as 
a controlling body and leave management free. 
However, a larger board may be more valuable for 
the breadth of its services.
DATA SOURCE AND MEASUREMENTS
There are two sources of data for this study. The 
data (2608 companies) on ownership from the year 
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1990 through to 2001 were obtained from annual 
company handbook published by The Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE). The study also excludes 
companies from the financial sectors that comprised 
banking and insurance companies. These years are 
chosen because the capital markets study requires 
ample number of years so as to provide reasonable 
duration for ownership and debt adjustments. This 
period is also assumed to be long enough to handle 
short-term irregularities and can provide a reliable 
estimate of company performance. 
 The sectors that are of interest to this study are 
the construction, the consumer products, hotels, 
industrial products, infrastructure companies, 
mining, plantation, property, technology as well as 
trading and services. 
MEASUREMENT OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES – 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Three types of data sets are utilised for analysis; 
data that proxy the performance criteria, data that 
described ownership and board structure of the firms 
and the control variables.
 There are six performance measures that are 
utilised as dependent variables in this analysis. The 
use of these six measures of performance is based 
on two reasons. Firstly, it is possible to compare 
them and their values because they measure 
different concepts of performance. Secondly, the 
extent to which measures to use whethers market 
or accounting measures of performance is related to 
the amount of “noise” inherent in their signals, and 
their sensitivity to board actions.   
 Nevertheless, the selection of variables is also 
guided by the results of previous studies that have 
been mostly conducted on the developed capital 
markets stocks. This is aimed at examining the 
influence of these variables, rather than to identify 
new variables on company performance of the 
KLSE. 
 For the purpose of this study, six measures of 
dependent variables considered as performance 
indicators are evaluated. These performance 
indicators are commonly used in studies on 
corporate governance. The six performance mesures 
are the Return on Assets (ROA) (Mehran 1995; Core 
et al. 1999; Denis & Denis 1994), Return on Equity 
(ROE) (Abowd 1990;  Core et al. 1999), Tobin Q (TQ) 
(Mehran 1995; Chung & Pruitt 1994; Rathinasamy 
et al. 2000), Economic Value Added (EVA) (Dodd 
& John 1999; O’Byrne 1996), Market Value Added 
(MVA) (Dodd & John 1999; O’Byrne 1996) and 
Market Book Value Ratio (MBR) (Denis & Denis 
1994). 
MEASUREMENT OF INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES – OWNERSHIP MEASURES
Equity represents ownership. The equity holdings 
by various investors that described ownership of 
the non-financial firms listed on the main board of 
the KLSE that are understudied are classified into 
categories. These categories are the ownership 
concentration and the ownership mix as well as 
the size of board and the equity held by the BOD. 
The following describes the proxy variables that 
represent the ownership measurements.
1) Ownership Concentration (OC) (La Porta et al. 
1998; Koke 2001; Claessens et al. 2000; Admati 
et al. 1994)
2) Ownership Mix/Type (OM)
a) Equity holdings of the corporate shareholders 
(CORP) (Karpoff 1998; Del Guerico & 
Hawkins 1999; Porter 1992), 
b) Equity holdings of the government owned  
companies (G) (Shleifer & Vishny 1997).
c)  Equity holdings of individual investors 
(INDI). Individual shareholders are direct 
ownership that hold shares in his own 
name. 
d)  Equity holdings of the nominees, both 
finance and public company (NF_NP).
e)   Board of Director Equity Holding (DIR_
HOL) (Agrawal & Knoebar 1996; Agrawal 
& Mandelker 1990; Mehran 1995).
3) Board Size (BOD) (Yermack 1996; Jensen 1993; 
& Eisenberg et al. 1998)
MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL VARIABLES
These factors are considered as control variables and 
are listed as below:   
1) Total Sale (TOTSALE) (Short & Keasey 1999; 
Jensen 1989)
2)  Debt Asset Ratio (DAR) (Rajan & Zingales; 
1995)  
3)  Percentage Change in Income (Growth) (Mehran 
1995).   
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METHODOLOGY
MODEL 1
Use to determine the effect of ownership concentration 
and board structure on firms’ performance. It is as 
follows:
 Yi = ai + b1iOC + b2iBOD + b3iDIR_HOL + 
    b4iTOTSALE + b5iGROWTH + b6iDAR + ei.
where,
 
 i = 1 to 6, Y1 =  ROA, Y2 =  ROE, Y3 =  EVA, Y4 
     =  MVA, Y5 =  MBR, Y6 =  TQ. 
MODEL 2
Use to determine the effect of ownership mix/types 
of the concentration and board structure on firms’ 
performance. It is as follows;
 Y i  =  a i +  b 1iCORP + b 2iG +  b 3iNF_NP + 
 b4iINDI + b5iBOD + b6iDIR_HOL + b7iTOTSALE + 
 b8iGROWTH + b9iDAR + ei .
 The log of measures of performance are used 
in this study. Models 1 and 2 are tested on all the 
industries. Test for heteroskadesticity is done on 
the data and the insignificance characteristics as 
indicated by the White tests denote that there is no 
heteroskadesticity problem with the data for the 
industries in this study.
FINDINGS
Pool estimates of Model 1 indicate significant effects 
of ownership concentration for performance measure 
of ROA, EVA, MVA, MBR and  TQ. This is observed in 
Table 1a. The analysis also shows that the model that 
uses EVA is the best model in term of the values of 
R2. We caution readers in interpreting the results for 
other models as the R2 are relatively low. Individual 
industry estimates (Table 1b) show that ownership 
concentration is significant to construction, hotel 
and industrial product sectors only as measured by 
ROA. Ownership concentration as measured by the 
top ten shareholders is also significant for consumer 
product and hotel industry as measured by ROE and 
it is significant for trading and services industry as 
measured by MVA. The regression of MBR dictates 
that ownership concentration shows significant 
contribution to the consumer product, industrial 
product and trading and services industries. The 
performance measure of TQ also stresses that 
ownership concentration is significantly important 
to construction, consumer product, and industrial 
product as well as trading and services sectors of 
the KLSE main board. This observation indicates that 
among all the performance measures, TQ regression 
depicts that ownership of top ten shareholders 
play significant role as governance mechanism in 
aligning the managers to 57% of listed firms. This 
is followed by MBR that is measured by 43% of top 
ten shareholders of the firms.    
 The board size is found to be insignificant for 
all sectors for performance measures ROS and ROE, 
but it is significant to industrial product and property 
industries as measured by MVA and only significant 
to Trading and Services industry as measured by 
MBR and TQ (Table 1c). 
 The director’s holding is important in monitoring 
the hotel sector activities as measured by ROA and 
ROE regressions. The MVA regression illustrates that 
director’s holding inverse relationship that helps 
significantly in improving the performance of the 
industrial product as well as the trading and services 
sectors. The regressions of MBR and TQ also illustrate 
significant contribution of director’s equity holding 
in ensuring the value-maximising interest of the 
shareholders for the consumer product, hotel and the 
plantation industries. Their effects are positive on 
both performance measures for plantation industry 
and negative for hotel industry.
 As depicted in Table 2a, the ownership 
concentration that is significant in the regression of 
ROA and ROE is actually the institutional shareholders 
that are controlling the whole industries. A different 
outlook is observed in the regression of MVA, MBR 
and TQ. The ownership concentration represented 
by institutional shareholders, the government 
ownership and the nominees dominate significantly 
in the regression of MVA regression. As for MBR and 
TQ regression, the institutional shareholders, the 
government and the individuals are the components 
that represent significant contribution to ownership 
concentrations in general. As in Table 1, we also 
observed the high value of R2 for EVA compared 
to other performance measures. This shows that 
for both model, EVA is the better measure for 
performance.
 Table 2b indicates that the positive effect on 
performance by concentrated ownership comes 
from the  institutional shareholders and nominees 
for construction sector, while the individuals equity 
holders dominates the consumer product industry 
98 /   Jurnal Pengurusan 30 (Julai 2010)
Variables@ ROA ROE MVA EVA MBR TQ
Intercepts 1.810 1.743*** 19.468*** 6.691*** 0.465** 6.972***
(10.460) (7.790) (84.960 (8.750) (2.470) (86.520)
OC 0.004*** 0.003 0.006*** 0.027*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(2.740) (1.400) (3.300) (3.600) (4.070) (4.140)
BOD 0.014 0.008 0.015 0.264*** 0.035** -0.027
(0.850) (0.400) (0.650) (4.310) (1.980) (-1.450)
DIR_HOL 0.001 -0.001 -0.012*** 0.083** -0.007** -0.004
(0.220) (-0.260) (-2.790) (2.290) (-2.000) (-1.150)
TOTSALE 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000***
(0.930) (0.200) (12.710) (0.840) (0.160) (-3.860)
GROWTH 0.0004*** -0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000**
(4.190) (-1.960) (2.550) (0.750) (1.600) (2.080)
DAR -2.240*** 0.624*** -0.783*** 4.292*** 0.212 -0.852***
(-9.33) (2.960) (-2.660) (3.900) (0.830) (-4.590)
R2 0.218 0.043 0.374 0.942 0.060 0.145
WT (ρ) 0.014 0.283 0.013 0.525 0.510 0.036
DW 1.907 1.978 1.354 2.426 1.273 1.114
N 1570 1570 1570 1570 1570 1570
TABLE 1a. Overall results for model 1
*** Indicates the coefficient is significant
@ OC=Ownership Concentration, BOD=Board Size, DIR_HOL=Board of Director Equity Holding, TOTSALE=Total Sale, GROWTH=Percentage 
Change in Income, and DAR=Debt Asset Ratio.
Sector Performance Measures
ROA ROE EVA MVA MBR TOBIN Q
Construction *** ***
Consumer Product *** *** ***
Hotel Industry *** ***






Trading and Services *** *** ***
TABLE 1b. Significance of ownership concentration to performance measures (by sector)
*** Indicates the coefficient is significant (all significant coefficients are positive).
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whereas institutional shareholders are dominant 
shareholders for industrial product sector. These 
effects are measured by ROA regression. For the 
plantation industry, the effect is mainly concentrated 
from the government shareholdings. This is as 
observed in the ROE regression. The government as 
legal institution monitors the performance of this 
plantation industry. The director equity holding too 
acts as important ownership determinant in ensuring 
the success of plantation industry as measured by 
MVA, MBR and TQ. The regression of TQ indicates 
that ownership concentration is dominated by the 
institutional shareholders in construction, industrial 
product and property industries. It is dominated by 
the nominees, individuals and the directors holding 
in the consumer product industry. For the same 
regression, ownership concentration is made up by 
the government and nominees as major shareholders. 
These shareholders monitor firm activities and align 
them toward attaining higher firm performance in 
the trading and services industry. 
CONCLUSION
The findings from this empirical study provides 
information on the importance of large institutional 
shareholders in corporate governance This study 
also providing evidence that, typically equity owned 
by the corporations, government, nominees and 
individuals are directly influencing the financial 
structures of the firms. This will eventually affect the 
overall performance of the firms. The equity holding 
Sector
Performance Measures










Trading and Services *** ***
TABLE 1c: Significance of board size to performance measures (by sector)
*** Indicates the coefficient is significant (all significant coefficients are positive).
Sector
Performance Measures
ROA ROE EVA MVA MBR TOBIN Q
Construction
Consumer Product ***(+) ***(+)







Trading and Services ***(-)
TABLE 1d. Significance of director’s holding to performance measures (by sector)
*** Indicates the coefficient is significant.
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by the directors also illustrates ample evidence that 
it affect firm performance in some sectors. This 
indicates that to encourage firm performance, the 
supply of suitable management and directors as 
well as other stakeholder’s information is important. 
Jensen (1993) suggest that larger board size is 
associated with greater risks (Jensen 1993), and 
decision making by larger groups is less effective as 
compared to smaller groups. In this study, generally 
we see that a contrasting result, except when MBR is 
used as the performance measure.
 Finally it is suggested that investors either as 
concentrated or diffuse ownership must participate 
actively in monitoring and aligning management 
and pushing them to change to better ways in 
achieving higher standard of firm performance 
thus maximising wealth. They must start thinking 
that they are actually owners of the firms and 
should maximise and exercise their rights in 
pushing the management to perform better. This 
will result in the formation of dynamic board and 
the building of strong management structure to 
enable them to control company risks at any levels 
in the organisation. Implementing this will result 
in aligning the investor’s interest with that of the 
managers.     
Variables@ ROA ROE EVA MVA MBR TQ
Intercepts 1.818*** 1.75*** 6.345*** 19.501*** 0.488*** 7.020***
(10.650) (7.950) (6.420) (85.880) (2.580) (37.100)
CORP 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.032* 0.005** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.210) (2.540) (2.270) (2.210) (3.680) (3.990)
G 0.001 0.000 -0.027 0.01291*** 0.006*** 0.010***
(0.210) (0.010) (-0.460) (4.070) (2.370) (3.630)
NF_NP 0.002 -0.001 0.012 0.007*** 0.003 0.003
(0.960) (-0.410) (0.740) (2.650) (1.550) (1.130)
INDI 0.007 0.010* 0.028* -0.009 0.01199** 0.010**
(1.570) (1.770) (2.170) (-1.280) (2.250) (2.080)
BOD 0.011 0.007 0.337** 0.011 (-0.035** -0.029
(0.700) (0.350) (4.110) (0.510) (-1.940) (-1.580)
DIR_HOL 0.000 -0.004 0.118** -0.008* -0.009** -0.005
(0.090) (-0.770) (2.690) (-1.660) (-2.230) (-1.260)
TOTSALE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000***
(1.540) (0.720) (0.330) (11.860) (0.000) (-3.860)
GROWTH 0.000*** -0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000**
(4.310) (-1.910) (0.460) (2.580) (1.510) (1.960)
DAR -2.198*** 0.675*** 4.933* 0.306 0.781***
-9.140 3.230 2.000 1.180 4.210
R2 0.240 0.066 0.961 0.405 0.063 0.157
WT (ρ) 0.000 0.772 0.559 0.080 0.532 0.231
DW 1.925 1.982 2.367 1.364 1.288 1.144
N 1570 1570 1570 1570 1570 1570
*** Indicates the coefficient is significant
@ CORP=Equity holdings of the corporate shareholders, G=Equity holdings of the government owned companies,  INDI=Equity holdings of 
individual investors,  NF_NP=Equity holdings of the nominees, both finance and public company, BOD=Board Size, DIR_HOL=Board of Director 
Equity Holding, TOTSALE=Total Sale, GROWTH=Percentage Change in Income, and DAR=Debt Asset Ratio.
TABLE 2a. Overall results for model 2
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 Since ownership structures and the company 
board of directors are considered as the corporate 
governance mechanisms, its research at any parts 
of the world is generally observed to describe 
as the system of rules and procedures employed 
in the conduct and control of listed company.  It 
does not seek to impose rigid and uniform models, 
but to contribute to the optimisation of company 
performances and to favour all those people whose 
interests are involved in the work of the company – 
investors, creditors and workers.
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